June 17, 2008
Making fun of the beard or clothes whose length etc. is in accordance with the Sunnah or other aspects of the Sunnah makes a person a kaafir, if he knows that this was proven from the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allaah be upon him), because he is thereby making fun of the words and actions of the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allaah be upon him). In this case he is opposing the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allaah be upon him) and making fun of his Sunnah, and the one who makes fun of the Sunnah and knowingly mocks things that are proven to be part of the Sunnah is not a Muslim.
Allaah says (interpretation of the meaning):
“Say: ‘Was it at Allaah, and His Ayaat (proofs, evidences, verses, lessons, signs, revelations, etc.) and His Messenger that you were mocking?’
Make no excuse; you disbelieved after you had believed”
[al-Tawbah 9:65-66]
If a person is called to observe one of the rulings of Islam and says that piety is in the heart but he does not follow the shar’i ruling, he is an evil liar. For faith includes both words and deeds, it is not simply the matter of what is in the heart. This view is the same as that of the evil innovators of the Murji’ah who restricted faith to the heart and said that it had nothing to do with outward actions. Moreover, if the heart is sound and filled with faith, that will be manifested in a person’s actions. The Prophet (peace and blessings of Allaah be upon him) said: “In the body there is a piece of flesh which, if it is sound, the entire body will be sound, and if it is corrupt, the entire body will be corrupt. Indeed it is the heart.” (Narrated by al-Bukhaari, 52; Muslim, 1599). And he also said: “Allaah does not look at the outward appearance or wealth of any one of you; rather he looks at your hearts and deeds.” (Narrated by Muslim, 2564)
Whatever the case, these words of those who stubbornly refuse to follow the truth and carry out the commands of Islam is a sign of their lack of faith by means of which they want to stop those who seek to call them to Islam and advise them.
Sheikh Muhammed Salih Al-Munajjid
Islam Q&A
Posted in Ruboobiyyah and Uloohiyyah 
Comments Off
June 17, 2008
Prayers should not be offered in mosques in which there are graves. The graves should be dug up and the remains transferred to the public graveyards, with each set of remains placed in an individual grave as with all other graves. It is not permissible for graves to be left in mosques, whether that is the grave of a wali (“saint”) or of anyone else, because the Messenger (peace and blessings of Allaah be upon him) forbade that and warned against that, and he cursed the Jews and Christians for doing that. It was narrated that he (peace and blessings of Allaah be upon him) said: “May Allah curse the Jews and the Christians, for they took the graves of their Prophets as places of worship.” ‘Aa’ishah (may Allaah be pleased with her) said, “He was warning against what they had done.” Narrated by al-Bukhaari, 1330, Muslim, 529.
And when Umm Salamah and Umm Habeebah told him about a church in which there were images, he (peace and blessings of Allaah be upon him) said: “When a righteous man died among them, they would build a place of worship over his grave and put those images in it. They are the most evil of mankind before Allaah.” (Saheeh, agreed upon. Al-Bukhaari, 427; Muslim, 528)
And he (peace and blessings of Allaah be upon him) said: “Those who came before you took the graves of their Prophets and righteous people as places of worship. Do not take graves as places of worship – I forbid you to do that.” (Narrated by Muslim in his Saheeh, 532, from Jundab ibn ‘Abd-Allaah al-Bajali). So the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allaah be upon him) forbade taking graves as places of worship and he cursed those who do that, stating that they are the most evil of mankind. So we must beware of that.
It is known that everyone who prays at a grave is taking it as a place of worship, and whoever builds a mosque over a grave has taken it as a place of worship. So we must keep graves far away from the mosques and not put graves inside mosques, in obedience to the command of the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allaah be upon him) and so as to avoid the curse issued by our Lord against those who build places of worship over graves, because when a person prays in a mosque in which there is a grave, the Shaytaan may tempt him to call upon the deceased or to seek his help, or to pray to him or prostrate to him, thus committing major shirk; and because this is the action of the Jews and Christians and we are obliged to differ from them and to keep away from their ways and their evil actions. But if the graves are ancient and a mosque was built over them, then it should be knocked down, because this is an innovated thing, as was stated by the scholars, and so as to avoid the means that may lead to shirk. And Allaah is the Source of strength.
Majmoo’ Fataawa wa Maqaalaat Mutanawwi’ah li Samaahat al Shaykh Ibn Baaz 10/246.
(Islam Q&A)
Posted in Ruboobiyyah and Uloohiyyah Comments Off
June 17, 2008
Shaykh Muhammad ibn ‘Uthaymeen said:
“Shirk is of two types, major shirk which puts a person beyond the pale of Islam, and lesser shirk.”
The first type, major shirk, is “Every type of shirk which the Lawgiver described as such and which puts a person beyond the pale of his religion” – such as devoting any kind of act of worship which should be for Allaah to someone other than Allaah, such as praying to anyone other than Allaah, fasting for anyone other than Allaah or offering a sacrifice to anyone other than Allaah. It is also a form of major shirk to offer supplication (du’aa’) to anyone other than Allaah, such as calling upon the occupant of a grave or calling upon one who is absent to help one in some way in which no one is able to help except Allaah.
The second type is minor shirk, which means every kind of speech or action that Islam describes as shirk, but it does not put a person beyond the pale of Islam – such as swearing an oath by something other than Allaah, because the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allaah be upon him) said that whoever swears an oath by something other than Allaah is guilty of kufr or shirk.”
The one who swears an oath by something other than Allaah but does not believe that anyone other than Allaah has the same greatness as Allah, is a mushrik who is guilty of lesser shirk, regardless of whether the one by whom he swore is venerated by people or not. It is not permissible to swear by the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allaah be upon him), or by the president, or by the Ka’bah, or by Jibreel, because this is shirk, but it is minor shirk which does not put a person beyond the pale of Islam.
Another type of minor shirk is showing off, which means that a person does something so that people will see it, not for the sake of Allaah.
The ways in which showing off may cancel out acts of worship are either of the following:
The first is when it is applies to an act of worship from the outset, i.e., the person is not doing that action for any reason other than showing off. In this case, the action is invalid and is rejected, because of the hadeeth of Abu Hurayrah which was attributed to the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allaah be upon him), which says that Allaah said, “I am so self-sufficient that I am in no need of having an associate. Thus he who does an action for someone else’s sake as well as Mine will have that action renounced by Me to him whom he associated with Me.”
(Narrated by Muslim, Kitaab al-Zuhd, no. 2985)
The second is when the showing off happens later on during the act of worship, i.e., the action is originally for Allaah, then showing off creeps into it. This may be one of two cases:
The first is when the person resists it – this does not harm him.
For example, a man has prayed a rak’ah, then some people come along during his second rak’ah and it occurs to him to make the rukoo’ or sujood longer, or makes himself weep, and so on. If he resists that, it does not harm him, because he is striving against this idea. But if he goes along with that, then every action which stemmed from showing off is invalid, such as if he made his standing or prostration long, or he made himself weep – all of those actions will be cancelled out. But does this invalidation extend to the entire act of worship or not?
We say that either of the following must apply:
Either the end of his act of worship was connected to the beginning (with no pause); so if the end of it is invalidated then all of it is invalidated.
This is the case with the prayer – the last part of it cannot be invalidated without the first part also being invalidated, so the whole prayer is invalid.
Or if the beginning of the action is separate from the end of it, then the first part is valid but the latter part is not. Whatever came before the showing off is valid, and what came after it is not valid.
An example of that is a man who has a hundred riyals, and gives fifty of them in charity for the sake of Allaah with a sound intention, then he gives fifty in charity for the purpose of showing off. The first fifty are accepted, and the second fifty are not accepted, because the latter is separate from the former.”
Majmoo’ Fataawa wa Rasaa’il Ibn ‘Uthaymeen, and al-Qawl al-Mufeed Sharh Kitaab al-Tawheed, vol. 1, p. 114, 1st edition
(Islam Q&A)
Posted in Ruboobiyyah and Uloohiyyah Comments Off
June 17, 2008
Sheikh Muhammad b. `Abd Allah al-Qannâs
Abû Hurayrah relates that the Prophet (peace be upon him) said: “There are no such things as omens. A favorable auspice is the best there is.”
They asked: “So what is a favorable auspice?”
The Prophet (peace be upon him) replied: “A good word that one of you hears.” [Sahîh al-Bukhârî (5754) and Sahîh Muslim (2223)] Read the rest of this entry »
Posted in Ruboobiyyah and Uloohiyyah Comments Off
June 17, 2008
Ibn Jareer mentioned a number of opinions concerning the meaning of this name: al-Muqeet means al-Hafeez (the Protector), al-Shaheed (the Witness), al-Hasab (the Sufficient), the One Who is in control of all things. He thought that the last interpretation is the correct one.
Allaah is al-Muqeet, i.e., the Protector, the Witness, the One Who is Able to do all things.
Al-Muqeet is the Preserver, the Omnipotent, the Witness; He is the One Who sends down provision to His creatures and shares it out among them.
Al-Muqeet is the Sustainer; He is taking care of all living beings, for when He causes parts of them to die over time, He compensates for that. At every moment He gives them what they need to survive, until He wills to put an end to their life – then He withholds what keeps them alive, and so they die.
Some reports give the name al-Mugheeth instead of al-Muqeet. Al-Mugheeth is interpreted as meaning the Helper, for He helps His slaves at times of difficulty when they call upon Him; He answers them and saves them. It also has the meaning of the One Who responds and the One Who is called upon. Ighaathah [help] refers to actions and istijaabah [responding] refers to words, but they may be used interchangeably.
Ibn al-Qayyim said:
“He is the Helper of all His creatures, and He responds to those who are desperate.”
Sharh Asmaa’ Allaah ta’aala al-Husna by Dr. Hissah al-Sagheer, p. 246
(Source: Islam Q&A)
Posted in 99 Names of Allah Comments Off
April 15, 2008
Firstly:
It was not permissible to address the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allaah be upon him) by saying “Ya Muhammad” during his lifetime, because Allaah says (interpretation of the meaning):
“Make not the calling of the Messenger (Muhammad sal-Allahu ‘alayhi was-Sallam) among you as your calling one of another” [al-Noor 24:63].
Al-Dahhaak said, narrating from Ibn ‘Abbaas: They used to say Ya Muhammad, Ya Aba’l-Qaasim, but Allaah told them not to do that, out of respect to His Prophet (peace and blessings of Allaah be upon him). So they said Ya Rasool Allaah (O Messenger of Allaah), Ya Nabi Allaah (O Prophet of Allaah). Mujaahid and Sa’eed ibn Jubayr said something similar.
Qataadah said: Allaah enjoined that His Prophet (peace and blessings of Allaah be upon him) should be treated with respect and venerated and honoured as a leader. Muqaatil ibn Hayyaan said: Do not address him by name when you call him and say Ya Muhammad, and do not say Ya Ibn ‘Abd-Allaah. Rather address him with honour and say Ya Nabi Allaah or Ya Rasool Allaah.
Maalik said, narrating from Zayd ibn Aslam: Allaah enjoined them to address him with honour.
So the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allaah be upon him) should not be addressed by name only, rather it should be said: Ya Rasool Allaah, Ya Nabi Allaah.
Secondly:
It is not permissible to call on the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allaah be upon him) in du’aa’ after his death, because du’aa’ is an act of worship that can only be directed to Allaah. Allaah says (interpretation of the meaning):
“And the mosques are for Allaah (Alone), so invoke not anyone along with Allaah” [al-Jinn 72:13].
“And who is more astray than one who calls on (invokes) besides Allaah, such as will not answer him till the Day of Resurrection, and who are (even) unaware of their calls (invocations) to them?”[al-Ahqaaf 46:5]
And the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allaah be upon him) said to Ibn ‘Abbaas (may Allaah be pleased with him): “If you ask, then ask of Allaah, and if you seek help then seek help from Allaah.” Narrated by al-Tirmidhi (2516) and classed as saheeh by al-Albaani in Saheeh Sunan al-Tirmidhi.
Du’aa’ is asking for benefit and asking for harm to be warded off, and it is not only done by saying Yaa (O…), rather it has become customary among people to use this call in du’aa’, especially when hardship comes and calamity strikes, so they say Ya Allaah, meaning O Allaah, save us, give us help, support us.
This is the action of monotheists (believers in Tawheed) who do not call upon anyone other than Allaah. As for those who worship graves and tombs, they call upon their “saints” and revered ones, saying Ya Badawi, Ya Rifaa’i, Ya Jilaani, and what they mean is, O Badawi, help us, come to our aid, save us.
And some of them say: Ya Rasool-Allaah, Ya Muhammad, in this manner also. This is calling upon him, seeking his help and turning to him.
It is well known that this is one of the worst ways of going against the message that was brought by Muhammad (peace and blessings of Allaah be upon him) and the other Messengers, and that was revealed in the Books, namely the call to Tawheed and worshipping Allaah alone, and forsaking the worship of all others.
It is not acceptable in the religion of Islam, which Allaah has chosen as the religion for His slaves, to call upon anyone except Allaah, not any Prophet who was sent or any angel who is close to Him. Rather we are to call upon Him alone. Hence Allaah says (interpretation of the meaning):
“Is not He (better than your gods) Who responds to the distressed one, when he calls on Him, and Who removes the evil, and makes you inheritors of the earth, generations after generations? Is there any ilaah (god) with Allaah? Little is that you remember!” [al-Naml 27:62]
Thus it is known that if a person says Ya Muhammad or Ya Rasool Allaah, not intending thereby to call upon him and seek his help, then there is nothing wrong with it, such as if he wants to call him to mind and remember him, such as if he reads a hadeeth and says Sall-Allaah ‘alayka ya Rasool-Allaah (May Allaah send blessings upon you, O Messenger of Allaah) or How great and beautiful are your words, O Messenger of Allaah. But saying Ya Muhammad is contrary to good manners, as explained above.
Shaykh Ibn Baaz (may Allaah have mercy on him) was asked: Is it shirk if someone says in any place on earth, Ya Muhammad Ya Rasool-Allaah, calling him?
He replied:
Allaah has stated in His Holy Book and on the lips of His Messenger (peace and blessings of Allaah be upon him) that worship is the right of Allaah alone and no one else has any share of it, and that du’aa’ is a kind of worship, so if a person says in any place on earth, Ya Rasool-Allaah, Ya Nabi Allaah or Ya Muhammad, help me, or save me, or support me, or heal me, or support your ummah, or heal the sick Muslims, and guide their misguided ones and so on, then he is making him a partner with Allaah in worship. The same applies to those who do the same thing with regard to other Prophets, angels, awliya’ (saints), jinn, idols or any other created beings, because Allaah says (interpretation of the meaning):
“And I (Allaah) created not the jinn and mankind except that they should worship Me (Alone)” [al-Dhaariyaat 51:56].
“O mankind! Worship your Lord (Allaah), Who created you and those who were before you so that you may become Al-Muttaqoon (the pious)” [al-Baqarah 2:21].
-Quote from Majmoo’ Fataawa al-Shaykh Ibn Baaz (2/453).
Shaykh Ibn ‘Uthaymeen (may Allaah have mercy on him) was asked: Some people at times of hardship say Ya Muhammad or Ya ‘Ali or Ya Jilaani. What is the ruling on that?
He replied:
If the intention is to call upon them and seek their help, then the person is a mushrik in the sense of major shirk that puts one beyond the pale of Islam, and he must repent to Allaah and call upon Allaah alone, as Allaah says (interpretation of the meaning):
“Is not He (better than your gods) Who responds to the distressed one, when he calls on Him, and Who removes the evil, and makes you inheritors of the earth, generations after generations? Is there any ilaah (god) with Allaah? Little is that you remember!” [al-Naml 27:62]
As well as being a mushrik, he is also fooling himself. Allaah says (interpretation of the meaning):
“And who turns away from the religion of Ibraaheem (Abraham) (i.e. Islamic Monotheism) except him who befools himself?” [al-Baqarah 2:130]
“And who is more astray than one who calls on (invokes) besides Allaah, such as will not answer him till the Day of Resurrection, and who are (even) unaware of their calls (invocations) to them?”
[al-Ahqaaf 46:5]
-Quote from Fataawa al-Shaykh Ibn ‘Uthaymeen (2/133).
And Allaah knows best.
Originally from Islam-QA
Posted in Ruboobiyyah and Uloohiyyah No Comments »
April 14, 2008
Before we begin, it is important to understand some of the important reasons for studying Allah’s Names. These reasons are innumerable:
Enumeration (ihsah) of Allah’s Names is a means to enter Paradise, as mentioned in the hadith of Abu Hurayrah.
The study of Allah’s Names is the most noble of all sciences. This is because the nobility of a science is connected to the nobility of its subject, and there is no subject that one can study more noble than Allah, as indicated by some of His Names such as al-`Aziz and al-Majid.
Because of the nobility and great importance of this subject, Allah’s Messenger (sal-Allahu ‘alayhi was-Sallam) gave greater attention to explaining it than he did any other matter. For this reason, we find that the Companions did not disagree concerning any of these matters while there was some disagreement amongst them concerning some of the legal ordinances (ahkam).
Knowledge of the Names of Allah is the basis for all other knowledge. Ibn al-Qayyim (may Allah have mercy on him) said: “Knowledge of the Most Beautiful Names of Allah is the basis of all other kinds of knowledge, for all of these other branches of knowledge are devoted to either a command or a creation of His.” ([Badaa’i’ al-Fawaa’id (1/163)].
It is one of the purposes of our creation. Allah (Subhanau wa Ta’ala) says:
“It is Allah who has created seven heavens and of the earth, the like thereof. [His] command descends between them so you may know that Allah is Powerful over all things and that Allah has encompassed all things in (His) Knowledge.” [65:12]
Thus it is that the Prophet (sal-Allahu ‘alayhi was-Sallam) stressed that all teaching and da`wah should begin with teaching mankind about Allah. When he sent Mu’adh to Yemen, he instructed him, saying:
“You shall come to a people of scripture, so of all things, first call them to the worship of Allah. Then, when they come to know Allah, then inform them that Allah has obligated upon them five prayers…” [Agreed Upon]
Ibn al-Qayyim, may Allah have mercy on him, said: “The key to the call of the Messengers, the essence of their Message, is knowing Allah through His Names, His Attributes, and His Actions, because this is the foundation on which the rest of the Message, from beginning to end, is built.” [Al-Sawaa’iq al-Mursalah `Ala al-Jahm?yyah wa’l-Mu`attilah by Ibn al-Qayyim, (1/150-151)]
Therefore, when a person occupies himself with learning about Allah, he is fulfilling the purpose for which he was created, but if he ignores this matter, he is neglecting what he was created for. The meaning of faith is not merely to utter words without knowing Allah, because true faith in Allah means that the slave knows the Lord in Whom he believes, and he makes the effort to learn about Allah through His Names and Attributes. The more he learns about his Lord, the more he increases in faith.
Thus it is that we have been commanded to know them. For example, Allah says:
“Know that Allah is of all things Knowing (`Alim).” [2:231]
“Know that Allah is severe in punishment and that Allah is Forgiving, Merciful.” [5:98]
If you truly understood who Allah is, you would never worship anyone else. This is because knowledge of Allah’s Greatness, His Vast Mercy, and all of His Beautiful Names and Attributes would instill in the worshipper a great love and fear of Allah (Subhanahu wa Ta’ala). He would realize that Allah is worthy of all worship because of the great Qualities of Majesty He possesses and that anyone who does not possess such qualities is not worthy of worship. Thus, we see that there is a reciprocal relationship between Tawhid al-Asma’ wa’l-Sifat and Tawhid al-Uluhiyyah.
Calling upon Allah & praising Him by these names is one of the greatest deeds and best forms of dhikr. Allah says:
“And to Allah belong the Most Beautiful Names, so call upon Him by them.” [7:180]
And Allah has ordered us in the Qur’an to engage in frequent dhikr:
“O you who believe, remember Allah with frequent remembrance.” [33:41]
How can you love Allah if you do not know Him?
A’ishah relates that the Prophet (sal-Allahu ‘alayhi was-Sallam) placed a man in command of an expedition. Whenever he would lead his companions in prayer, he would finish his recitation with Qul Huwa Allahu Ahad [Surah al-Ikhlas]. When they returned, they mentioned this to the Prophet, so he said, “Ask him why he does that?”
He said, “Because it is the Description of the Most Merciful (Sifat al-Rahman), and I love to recite it.”
The Prophet (sal-Allahu ‘alayhi was-Sallam) said, “Inform him that Allah loves Him.” [Agreed Upon]
Without a doubt, the most important of all subjects in the Qur’an is al-Asma’ al-Husnah, as Ibn Taymiyyah, may Allah have mercy on him, states in Dar’ Ta`aarud al-`Aql wa’l-Naql (5/310-312),
The Qur’an makes mention of Allah’s Names, His Attributes, and His Actions more than it does of eating, drinking, and marital relations in Paradise. The verses that mention Allah’s Attributes and Names are greater in importance than the verses concerning the Hereafter. Thus, the greatest verse in the Qur’an is Ayat al-Kursi as established in the authentic ?ad?th reported by Muslim from the Prophet (sal-Allahu ‘alayhi was-Sallam) that he said to Ubayy b. Ka`b, “Do you know which verse in the Book of Allah is greatest?”
He said, “Laa Ilaha Illa Huwa al-Hayy al-Qayyum” [2:255]
He struck him on the chest with his hand and he said, “May knowledge be easy and pleasant for you, O Abu’l-Mundhir.”
The best surah in the Qur’an is Umm al-Qur’an (al-Fatihah) as mentioned in the hadith of Abu Sa’eed b. al-Mu`alla in the Sahih: The Prophet (sal-Allahu ‘alayhi was-Sallam) said to him, “The likes of it has not been revealed in the Tawrah, the Injil, the Zabur, or the Qur’an, and it is the Seven Oft-Recited [Verses] (al-Sab` al-Mathani) and the Great Recital (al-Qur’an al-’Azim) which I have been given,” and it makes more mention of Allah’s Names and Attributes than it does of the Hereafter.
Furthermore, it has been established from him (sal-Allahu ‘alayhi was-Sallam) in the Sahih from numerous routes that “Qul Huwa Allahu Ahad” [112:1] equals one-third of the Qur’an.
It is also established in the Sahih that he gave glad tidings to the one who used to recite it and would say, “I love it because it is the description (Sifah) of al-Rahman,” that Allah loves him. Thus, he clarified that Allah loves anyone who loves the mention of His Attributes (Sifaat), Glorified and Exalted is He, and this is a vast topic.
Posted in 99 Names of Allah No Comments »
April 14, 2008
by Abu Bakr b. Nasir
This is the beginning of a series studying the Most Beautiful Names of Allah. The focus of this series is to help the reader to understand and implement the famous hadith of the 99 Names.
Abu Hurayrah has reported that the Prophet (sal-Allahu ‘alayhi was-Sallam) said:
“Indeed, Allah has Ninety-Nine Names, one hundred less one, whoever enumerates (ahsaahah) them shall enter Paradise.” [Agreed Upon]
This hadith is known to almost all of us, however, it is surrounded by many misconceptions. For that reason, in this series, we shall endeavor to explain what is meant by this hadith as well as a brief overview of some of the fundamental principles of Ahl al-Sunnah wa’l-Jama’ah in understanding Allah’s Names. Then, a brief explanation will be given of the meanings of many of the Names of All?h that can be found in the Qur’an and in the Sunnah.
Posted in 99 Names of Allah No Comments »
April 14, 2008
By Abul-Hussein at Ahl al-Hadith
Regarding The Existence Of Metaphor In The Arabic Language
The sound position regarding metaphor is that it is exists in language of the Arabs. This it itself is a general statement that is governed by a qualification. Metaphor exists in the language of the Arabs but it is not to be applied to the names and attributes of Allah (swt). The scholars of Usul al-Fiqh have treated this topic under the section of Usul al- Fiqh entitled: Contradicitions Between Literal And Metaphorical Meaning
The Rule Of Thumb Regarding Metaphor:
When a conflict arises between the metaphorical and literal meaning and usage of a word then preference is given to the literal meaning and usage. This is the norm unless there is proof that justifies the employing the metaphor usage of a word to the exclusion of the literal meaning and usage. What the scholars of Ilm al-Kalam (Theology) have suggested is that the use of metaphor is to be given preference when dealing with the Names and Attributes of Allah (swt). This position is predicted on reason (rational proof) rather than linguistic proof. Therefore, the position of the Scholars Of Kalam is not consistent with the principle we mentioned that governs the usage of metaphor as treated in Usul al-Fiqh. The evidence (dalil) of the Scholars of Kalam is not grounded in the well established principle (qa’ida) that governs the usage of metaphor. Rather, the Scholars of Kalam turn to reason they treat their use of reason (intellect) as a legitimization of employing metaphor in the Names And Attributes. Reason in itself, is not a proof weighty enough to justify abandoning the literal usage of a term in the absence of linguistic proof that legitimizes the use of metaphor.
he Rule Applying To The Names And Attributes Of Allah
There is nothing similar or equal to Allah (swt). Allah (swt) can not be compared to anything for none knows the Essence of Allah (swt). Comparison between things means knowledge of likes, knowledge of the two things that are two be compared. Nothing that comes to mind is like Allah (swt) Allah (swt) is unlike all of creation. The principle of the scholars of Usul al-Fiqh for interpreting the Book and the Sunnah is that the literal meaning of a word is given the preference unless there is valid linguistic evidence to justify recourse to metaphor in its stead. What the Scholars Of Kalam offer as a justification for recourse to metaphor in the Names And Attributes Of Allah (swt) is not substantial enough as it does not coincide with the principle that governs the use metaphor in the place of the literal meaning of the Names and Attributes of Allah (swt).
Shaikh Muhammad Mukhatar ash Shinqiti al Usuli al Maliki (h)
Comment Of Abul-Hussein:
A Balanced Approach In Dealing With The Topic Of Metaphor
This position of Shaikh Muhammad Mukhtar Shinqiti (h) on how to deal with metaphor is also the position of Shaikh Sadiq Hasan Khan (r) and others. This is a balanced position as it decreases conflict between various schools of Aqeeda. Also this position is rooted in principles and supported by proof. As regards the position of Imam Ibn Taymiyah (r) towards metaphor i.e., the absence of metaphor in the Arabic language this is not a new position. The position of Ibn Taymiyah (r) on metaphor is often misrepresented partly because it is misunderstood. Ibn Taymiyah (r) does not employ the same terminology to treat the topic of metaphor that we find common among those who follow the ideas of Imam Sakaaki (scholar of rhetoric). There is a point wherein Ibn Taymiyah agrees with the majority of scholars in the issue of metaphor but he gives it a different name and their is a part wherein he disagrees. What confuses the issue greatly is that Imam Ibn Taymiyah (r) does not use the same terminology to deal with aqeeda or rhetoric that is common among other scholars. He has his own terminology that is divested of close association with Greek philosophy. In fact, Ibn Taymiyah aimed to use terminology that has a ground in the Book, Sunnah or Arabic language. Our other Imams, did not take this position they utilized the logic of the Greeks and the basics of the rationale of Greek philosophy to construct terminology and standardize it. So that they developed a technical language that was shared and common and utilized in Islamic sciences. Imam Ibn Taymiyah (r) constructed a system and rationale for the construction of terminology that was grounded directly in the Qur’an or Sunnah and Arabic. The idea that Ibn Taymiyah argues for is that there has been a misuse of metaphor in the Arabic language and that there are some uses that came to be popular in later scholarship that emerged with schools of rhetoric influenced by Greek thought.
Imams In The Madhab That Claims There Is No Metaphor In The Arabic Language
The position that there is no metaphor in the Arabic language was also the position of Muhammad Abu Bakr, Asfour Daud adh Dhahiri, Abi Ishaq as Safraa’ienni, Saeed Bin Mundhir and the scholars of Usul al Fiqh leaned in their direction. Imam Suyuti and Imam Zarkashi before him chronciled the differences of the Ulema regarding metaphor in the Arabic language. In recent times al-Allamah Amin Shinqiti al Maliki al Mufasir (r) took the position that metaphor does not exist in the Arabic language.
Closing Words Regarding The Matter Of Metaphor
The use of metaphor has great implication in the way Aqeeda is treated. This subject is technical and is truly an area that requires great patience, tolerance and learning. It is not facile to rightly declare those who reject metaphor to be incorrect without understanding their reasoning the source of their position and without first having gained depth in the Arabic language.
In order to gain a position in this topic that affords one the ability to critically judge one must be familiar with the Imams of Arabic and be intimate with the Imams of Rhetoric and knowledgeable of the schools and opinions therein. Also one is required to understand how these schools developed and the contours of the debates that took place among the Imams of language. Like, fiqh language studies also were characterized by madhabs.
Because this topic requires a degree of study it is best to suspend judgment or take a position by following an Imam without engaging debate. To debate this matter without a background is a mark of great ignorance. This issue requires much more than listening to a position and refutation it also entails understanding how various schools of thought in Arabic have an impact on Usul al fiqh and Aqeeda. So it is best left alone. We are not obliged to follow Ibn Taymiyah (r) but it is silly to think that he is easily refuted by the shallow claim that he was wrong and that is it. In any case, the balanced approach for the Athari in this matter is that metaphor exists in the Arabic language but it does not apply to the Names and Attributes of Allah (swt) and the rules when dealing with the Names and Attributes Of Allah (swt) is that Allah is disimilar to all creation and thought.
References:
1.) Explanation of Zad al Mustaqna By Muhammad Mukhtar Shinqiti (h)
2.) Metaphor Between those who stand by it and those who reject it volume three by Doctor Abdul Adheem Ibrahim Muhammad al Mu’tee printed by Maktaba Wahba
3.) Jaame Li Ahkam Wa Usul al Fiqh by Sadiq Hasan Khan
Posted in Advaned Topics in Asmaa wa Sifaat No Comments »
April 14, 2008
By Yasir Qadhi, originally posted at MuslimMatters.org
Note: This is a short essay that I wrote during my Comprehensive Exams as part of the requirements of the PhD at Yale. The question was with regards to atomism and the role that it had on the groups of kal?m, in particular the Ash’arites. I’ve decided to post it here, as is.
The article demonstrates, inter alia, the reason why orthodox scholars of the past (viz., the Ahl al-Had?th and those who followed them) disapproved of kal?m. The obvious Hellenistic roots of kal?m, the cosmological premises that it posited, and the theological positions that were derived from such roots and premises, do not have any basis in the Sacred Texts, and in fact in most instances contradict them.
Additionally, it is simply preposterous to presume that the Companions themselves, or even the Prophet salla Allahu alayhi wa sallam, knew of these concepts or based their theology on them (and even the Ash’arites do not claim this). And surely, if the Prophet and Companions were not using such tools, then there is no need to use them, especially since they lead to positions that appear to contradict the Qur’?n and Sunnah.
Introduction of the Concept
The concept of all matter being composed of small, indivisible particles called atoms most likely goes back to the fifth century B.C., when a young contemporary of Socrates, known as Democritus, first formally introduced the idea (most likely under the influence of his teacher Leucippus). He claimed that if one continually kept dividing matter, eventually a particle would be reached that could not be divided anymore: an a-tom, i.e., ‘not divisible’. He also posited the existence of empty spaces between these atoms within which they could move - a pure ‘void’. He believed that all of the workings of the universe were the result of the vibrations of these atoms through voids and their collisions with one another.
Plato, and in particular his student Aristotle, strongly disagreed. The latter, in his Physics, wrote quite extensively against the existence of both the ‘atom’ and the ‘void’, claiming that not only were Democritus’ evidences lacking, but also that the existence of atoms and voids violated physical principles. In turn, Plato posited the ‘four natural elements’ theory: fire, air, earth and water form the basis of all else.[1]
These Greek philosophers - both the atomists and antiatomists - were attempting to explain natural occurrences and daily phenomenon without the need of resorting to supernatural explanations and believing in heavenly (or earthly) deities.[2] It is, therefore, rather ironic that this tool was then adopted by a faction of a monotheistic faith (i.e., the mutakallim?n) in their attempt to prove the all encompassing efficacy of an omnipotent God.[3] However, in their adoption of this cosmological view, they ensured that they sufficiently modified it so as to conform with and eventually support their theological positions.[4]
Kal?m Atomism
From its earliest inception in the second century of the hijra, kal?m has always been fascinated with the theory of atoms. A cursory look at the relevant sections in al-Ash’ar?’s (d. 324/935) Maq?l?t shows the center stage this issue took.[5] And although the mutakallim?n disagreed about certain secondary issues regarding atomism (such as the minimum quantity of atoms required for a ‘body’, the quantity of atoms that a single atom is allowed to touch, and so forth), the broad theory was generally upheld by both the Mu’tazilites and Ash’arites.[6]
The mutakallim?n posited that all matter is composed of identical, miniscule, indivisible particles (i.e., atoms), that are devoid of any quantitative or qualitative properties. They only acquire quantitative properties of width, height, and breadth when two or more of them unite (at which point it becomes a ‘body’), and they only acquire qualitative properties when an ‘accident’ is created within it. An accident is something that exists above and beyond the actual body. It is an accident that gives each atom (and, thereby, each body) its specific qualities that separates it from other atoms (and bodies); qualities such as color, temperature, speed or rest, life, knowledge, power, and so forth. Such accidents must reside in the atom itself, in fact by definition an accident cannot exist except within an atom.
Broadly speaking, the Mu’tazilites and Ash’arites were in agreement with regards to the affirmation of atomism, the most prominent exception being the eccentric al-Na???m (d. 230/845), who was influenced by Aristotle’s denial of atomism. Due to this view, al-Na???m was forced to invent the concept of the ‘leap’ (?ufrah).[7] Also, in contrast to the Greek philosophers (and also the fal?sifa), the mutakallim?n strongly affirmed the belief that both atoms and accidents were created, and that matter was not eternal.[8]
One of the most profound and unique contributions of the Ash’arites to the atomism debate was their proposition that ‘No accident can last two successive instances of time.’[9] In other words, as soon as an accident is created, it immediately ceases to exist. There is no continuity or connection between one moment in time and another. This means that if an object were to, say, remain in a state of rest, the accident of ‘rest’ must be continually created and re-created at each successive instant in time for the object to remain so. And, of course, it is only God who could create each and every accident on each and every body in each and every instance of time. The entire universe and all that transpires in it, according to the Ash’arites, must be directly controlled by God at each specific instance.
Another philosophical (albeit not original) contribution was the idea that time itself is composed of discrete and successive units, a type of ‘atomic-time’. This was derived not only from Aristotle’s notion that space, time and movement are all existentially equivalent, but also from the problem of trying to solve Zeno’s paradox as applied to time.[10]
These two positions necessarily leads to a denial of causality, meaning that the Ash’arites completely negated a cause-and-effect relationship between any two occurrences. Everything that occurred was disconnected, time and space, from anything preceding or following it. Even a body that remained a certain color did so because God continually re-created the accident of color in all of its atoms, at each instance in time (i.e., at each ‘atomic-time’ unit). A rock thrown at a window could not cause the window to shatter; an arm lifting a cup was not the cause of its lifting; the ingestion of food was not the cause of satiation; the proximity of fire to wool did not cause the wool to alight; and so forth.
With such a radical view of the world, the Ash’arites were then forced to explain not only the continuity of the universe around us (materials did not typically vanish, or transform into another substance, or change color, or inexplicably move from one instance to the next), but also the very clear causal connections upon which the livelihood of men rests. It is only because man eats that he does not starve to death, it is only because a fire is lit that food can be cooked, and so forth. Pressed with such factual realities, the Ash’arites (and in particular al-Ghaz?l?) developed the theory of ‘God’s habitual character’ or ‘?dah, meaning that God had ordained upon Himself to act within certain norms.[11] Thus, an object that is at rest is recreated by God at the second instance still at rest, an object that is brought close to fire and is flammable shall be set alight by God not due to the fire, but because God’s custom dictates so, and so on..
This theory safeguarded the permanent order of the universe, and also explained the apparent ‘causal’ relationship in daily life. What man perceives as ‘permanent’ is merely God’s habit (‘?dah) manifesting itself, at each successive instant. Contingent events, which man perceives as having been subject to natural physical causes, are in fact the direct result of God’s constant intervention.
Other Theological Implications of Atomism
The concept of atomism was deployed by the Ash’arites in many different fields. In what can only be described as a pun on ideas, it is true to state that the concept of atomism itself became the fundamental building block of all other aspects of Ash’arite theology.
So, for example, based upon this cosmological view, the Ash’arites formalized more than one elaborate proof for the existence of God, the most common one being the ‘dal?l al-’a’r?? wa ?ud?th al-ajs?m’, or the ‘Proof from accidents and temporality of bodies.’ This proof relies upon the fact that (i) existence is divided into bodies (composed of multiple atoms), and accidents; (ii) bodies are inherently composed of temporal accidents and cannot exist without them, and so: (iii) ‘that which is composed of temporal elements and does not precede it must also be temporal.’ Some of the Ash’arites sought to prove this method from the story of Abraham as he ‘searched’ for God via the celestial objects (Q. 6:71-79). They claimed that Abraham understood that the star, moon and Sun could not be gods because they were moving, and movement was an accident, hence Abraham realized that any body that carried within it an accident must be created and not a God.[12]
Furthermore, based upon this atomic conception, they proved that God is One, and cannot be more than one. This proof is known as dal?l al-tam?nu’, or the ‘Proof from mutual exclusion’. A summary of this is as follows: suppose that the universe had two gods, and one of them wished to create the accident of motion within an atom, while the other wished to create the accident of rest. Logically, there are only three possibilities: (i) both of them fail; (ii) both are successful; (iii) one of them is successful while the other fails. The first two logical possibilities are actually impossible, as the two are mutually exclusive, and the object has to be characterized with one of these opposing accidents. This only leaves the third option. And by definition, the one whose will is overpowering all else must be a God, and the one whose will was overpowered cannot be a god.
The Ash’arites and Mu’tazilites also propounded a theory of understanding God’s Attributes based upon their respective understandings of atomism. The primary issue at stake for them was that God could not be a place (ma?all) where accidents exist, as that would imply that He was a body composed of atoms (since accidents by definition need atoms to subside in), and hence created. So, for the Ash’arites, who defined an ‘accident’ as that which cannot last two successive instances, to posit any ‘change’ in God or from God would constitute an accident. And since all accidents must by definition reside in bodies, any accident posited of God would imply that God was a body. It was based upon this definition of ‘accidents’ that the Ash’arites could affirm God’s never-changing attributes of Life, Power, Knowledge, Hearing, Seeing, Will, and Speech, and interpret other Attributes figuratively, especially those that implied any type of motion (such as istiw? and nuz?l).
For the Mu’tazilites, on the other hand, an ‘accident’ was defined as ‘that which is superfluous to the essence (dh?t) of a substance.’[13] For them, any meaning that was not inherent to a being and extraneous to its essence (z?’id ‘al? al-dh?t) constituted an accident. Al-Q??? ‘Abd al-Jabb?r expounded on this when he said that if God actually had power, this would imply that He were a body, as power can only be potentialized when it resides in a body.[14] Hence, to affirm any characteristic to God would imply that an accident resided within God, which would necessitate God being a body, which would in turn entail that God was created. This helps explain why Mu’tazilite doctrine concerned itself with how best to phrase some of God’s capabilities, (e.g., ‘God knows with His essence’, or ‘God knows with a knowing that is Himself’, or ‘God’s knowing implies that He is not ignorant’, and so forth) as they could not explicitly affirm any meaning within God, yet at the same time could not deny that God, for example, knows everything.[15]
Yet another theological tangent that atomism provided a basis for was that of predestination. In particular, the Ash’arite understanding of qadr was directly linked to their conceptualization of matter.
Atomism and Predestination
The Ash’arite position on predestination is that God creates the actions of the servant directly without the servant himself causing that act, and that the servant then ‘acquires’ the reward or punishment of that deed. Hence, there is only an illusion of free-will, for in the end all actions are a direct result of God’s will and action. This theory, propounded by al-Ash’ar? himself, is known as the theory of ‘acquisition’, or kasb. It is, of course, based directly on Ash’arite belief of God re-creating accidents within atoms at each and every second. Man, being merely the agency upon which these accidents are created, cannot actually be the cause of any of his own ‘actions’.[16] Hence, atomism was the key factor that led Ash’arites to deny both natural causality and human free-will.
This understanding led to another ethical dilemma, and that was the accusation of God doing something evil.[17] How was it possible, the Mu’tazilites charged, that God would Himself create the actions of His servant and then punish them for it? This was the essence of evil.
In response to this charge, or perhaps pre-empting it, al-Ash’ar? developed his doctrine of what constitutes ‘evil’. For al-Ash’ar?, evil was merely what God had prohibited, and good was what He had commanded.[18] Therefore, according to him, no act is inherently judged as good or evil - human intellect and rationality play no role in this regard. Later Ash’arite authorities concurred.[19] Hence, for the Ash’arites, unless God explicitly states so, there is nothing that is ‘good’ or ‘evil’ in the first place! God does not punish or reward based upon a deed - God’s rewards are a gift from him, and His punishment an indication of his Justice, and nothing is required or obligatory on God.[20]
Therefore, for the Ash’arites, based on their definition of evil, the charge that it is evil to deprive man of free-will and then subsequently punish him for actions which God created holds no weight. Man does not have the capacity, or even right, to say what is evil and what is good.
The Mu’tazilites took the exact opposite view. Before explaining their position on free-will, it is interesting to note that, unlike the Ash’arites, the Mu’tazilites did not reduce the concept of causality to a simple and wholly unequivocal scheme, hence it is rather difficult to piece together the relationship between their version of atomism and their position on qadr; for this response, some general observations will be made.[21]
The Mu’tazilites were, of course strong proponents of free-will, hence they denied that God created man’s actions. Instead, they supported the doctrine that man created his own actions with the power that God had given him.[22]
This led to a detailed discussion of the concept of tawallud amongst them: whether (and to what extent) a human action could cause other actions. As an example, suppose a man shoots an arrow, and another person diverts it, and an innocent person is killed, who is morally responsible for his death?[23] Despite the differences that the Mu’tazilite had amongst themselves, as a whole they affirmed causality and believed that substances posses properties that have the capacity to affect other properties.
In contrast to the Ash’arites, they viewed that it was rationally possible to judge actions as evil or good (the issue of al-tahs?n al-’aql?). This basic premise played a profound role in their understanding of qadr. For the Mu’tazilites, if God were to directly create man’s actions and then punish him for those actions, while man himself has been deprived of free-will, this would be the height of tyranny and injustice. Therefore, God cannot be the creator of man’s deeds. For the Mu’tazilites, the Sacred Law only confirms what the intellect has already judged; it does not play any extra role in this decision.[24]
Conclusion:
Atomism was accepted by all factions of kal?m and incorporated into their theological models. Even though it was the Mu’tazilites who began the discussion, it was the Ash’arites who took it to a whole new level, and relied upon it even more than the Mu’tazilites.
For the Ash’arites, the only perpetual object is the atom. The atom itself is created at a specific point in time, but after that time, it remains in creation until God wills otherwise. Everything else in the world besides the atom is ‘accidental,’ meaning something that lasts for only a fleeting instant. And time itself is composed of discrete, successive units that are not directly connected to each other. It is God who must create and re-create each accident, on each atom, at each instance of time. Based upon this understanding, they extracted proofs for God’s existence, His Unity, His Attributes, and His all-encompassing power (i.e., predestination). Additionally, they denied natural causality.
For the Mu’tazilites, although they did use their understanding of atomism to derive similar proofs for God’s existence, since they defined ‘accidents’ in a manner different to that of the Ash’arites, their understanding of God’s attributes differed as well. Additionally, they did not elaborate upon the relationship of atomism with free-will as much as the Ash’arites did.
Other issues, not directly related to atomism, also played a role in conceptualizing their respective positions on predestination versus free-will. For the Mu’tazilites, if God demanded obedience from man yet simultaneously created his actions and deprived him of any free-will, it would be the height if injustice and contradict Divine Wisdom. All of this is clear and incontrovertible, according to them, because the intellect is capable of deciding what is praiseworthy and what is not. For the Ash’arites, since the intellect plays no role in deciding good from evil, it was not possible to judge any of God’s actions. Therefore, if God requires us to do something and, at the same time, does not grant us an independent will to execute it, that is permissible, for God can commit no injustice, and we cannot judge the actions of God.
Postscript
The debate of whether this elusive ‘smallest indivisible object’ actually exists remains alive up until today. The belief in such objects survived, even as it adapted and modified itself through many controversies, via medieval Christianity, Jewish philosophy, and the Renaissance. Finally, in the post-Enlightenment period, John Dalton (d. 1844) formulated his concept of the atomic theory, which was then developed and held sway for much of the 19th and early 20th century. For the first time, atoms were discovered to be of different types, and molecules to be combinations of atoms. Daltonian physics still considered the atom to be the smallest indivisible unit, but claimed (unlike kal?m) that atoms of different substances were different from one another. From the early part of the 20th century, physicists, starting with Rutherford (d. 1937), discovered smaller sub-atomic particles from which atoms were made, namely, electrons, protons and neutrons. This then gave way (largely due to the efforts of Max Planck (d. 1947) and Albert Einstein (d. 1955)) to quantum mechanics, and later to the discovery of even smaller sub-atomic particles, such as quarks and leptons, which are currently believed to combine in specific ways to form protons and neutrons. Research is still being done in this field, and daily discoveries and experiments continue to shape and challenge current theories.
For those theologians who based aspects of their theology on atomism, it is interesting to posit how these new scientific discoveries might possibly affect their theological models and positions.
[1] See: John McDonnell, The Concept of an Atom from Democritus to John Dalton (New York: 1991) p. 1-4, 21-25.
[2] Bernard Pullman, The Atom in the History of Human Thought (Oxford University Press: 1998), p. 17.
[3] Wolfson, Philosophy of the Kal?m, p. 468.
[4] It should be noted that there is a very strong possibility of Indian atomism heavily influencing the mutakallim?n as well, as Pines (p. 117) and Wolfson (p. 473) show.
[5] Al-Ash’ar?, Maq?l?t, p. 314-321.
[6] Much has been written on this. The standard introduction is that of Shlomo Pines, Studies in Islamic Atomism (Jerusalem: 1997). Also see Richard M. Frank, “Bodies and Atoms: The Ash’arite Analysis;” Bernard Pullman, The History of the Atom, p. 107-114; Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Kal?m, p. 466-518; EI2, s.v., ‘Djuz’. It is interesting to note that the most accessible and elaborate explanation of kal?m atomism has been written by the Jewish philosopher Maimonides, in his Guide to the Perplexed. D. Macdonald has translated and analyzed these passages in his article “Continuous Recreation and Atomic Time,” Isis, v. 9 (1927).
[7] Wolfson, Philosophy, p. 495. The ?ufrah is the belief that an object has the capacity to move from point A to point C without traveling through the intermediate point B but rather ‘leaping’ over it. This belief was needed in order to explain how a body could traverse from point A to point C when, according to al-Na???m, there were an infinite amout of points between them.
[8] Ibid, p. 471.
[9] See, for example, al-Ash’ar?, Maq?l?t, p. 358; al-Baghd?d?, U??l al-D?n, p. 50, al-Ghaz?l?, Tah?fut, p. 88.
[10] Macdonald, ‘Continuous Re-Creation,’ p. 320.
[11] See al-Ghaz?li’s Seventeenth Discussion in his Incoherence (tr. Marmura), p.171-3.
[12] Al-B?qill?ni, al-In??f, p. 44. I have written a paper on this specific issue elsewhere. Also see: Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Kal?m, p. 386-390; Herbert Davidson, Proofs for eternity, creation, and the existence of God in medieval Islamic and Jewish philosophy.
[13] Al-Ash’ar?, Maq?l?t, p. 369; Frank, “Bodies and Atoms,” p. 42.
[14] Shar? U??l al-Khamsah, p. 162.
[15] It goes without saying that both the Ash’arites and Mu’tazilites had other concerns as well, all of which led them to formulate their respective doctrines regarding the Attributes of God; the point here is to stress how their theory of atomism directly affected their conceptualization of God’s Attributes.
[16] Watt, The Formative Period, p. 315.
[17] It also led them to develop a unique understanding of God’s justice: for the Ash’arites, God was never unjust, not because He chose not do show injustice (the Mu’tazilite position), but rather because whatever He did was always just. Hence, if He rewarded a sinner or punished a just man, that recompense in and of itself would constitute Justice on God’s part. This of course solved the conundrum of how God could (from the Mu’tazilite perspective) ‘force’ someone to do something and then punish him for it.
[18] Al-Ash’ar?, Ris?lah ?l? Ahl al-Thaghr, p. 74.
[19] See, for example, ‘Abd al-Q?hir al-Bahd?d?, U??l al-D?n, p. 149; ‘A?ad al-D?n al-?j?, al-Maw?qif, p. 323.
[20] See, for example, al-B?qill?n?’s description of this in his al-In??f p. 48.
[21] See Pines discussion of this in his Studies, p. 32-34. I believe this issue certainly warrants further study.
[22] al-Q??? Abd al-Jabb?r, al-Mughn?, v 2, p. 340.
[23] Pines, p. 37-8; al-Ash’ar?, Maq?l?t, p. 408-10.
[24] See al-Q??? Abd al-Jabb?r, al-Mughn?, v. 6, p. 26, 30 - 34. Also, it should be borne in mind that the Mu’tazilite authorities differed amongst themselves on some of the finer details of this issue. In particular, is an act inherently good or evil, or is it due to external consequences that such a description can be made? The former view is held by the Baghdadian authorities, while the Basrians held the latter view.
Posted in Advaned Topics in Asmaa wa Sifaat No Comments »
content rss
